carry over to non-software platforms and, partially, to upstream and downstream firms. The model also explains why Microsoft …We consider a software vendor first selling a monopoly platform and then an application running on this platform. He … Office is priced significantly higher than Microsoft's operating system …

over to non-software platforms and, partially, to upstream and downstream firms. The model also explains why Microsoft …We consider a software vendor first selling a monopoly platform and then an application running on this platform. He … Office is priced significantly higher than Microsoft's operating system. …

carry over to non-software platforms and, partially, to upstream and downstream firms. The model also explains why Microsoft …We consider a software vendor first selling a monopoly platform and then an application running on this platform. He … Office is priced significantly higher than Microsoft's operating system. …

We consider a software vendor selling both a monopoly platform (e.g. operating system) and an application that runs on … more profits with his platform. Second, the competitor's entry serves as a credible commitment to lower prices for … model also gives an answer to the much debated question why Microsoft prices MS Office significantly higher than its …

In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the …

In this paper we study price competition, equilibrium market configurations and entry when firms compete in vertically … complement is a duopoly, whereas the other is a monopoly. In such framework, when products are highly di¤erentiated, the low …

Platforms often use fee discrimination within their marketplace (e.g., Amazon, eBay, and Uber specify a variety of …, we show that (1) banning fee discrimination and platform entry is detrimental to welfare, (2) a vertical merger within a … retail market mitigates fee distortions but is often worse than an equilibrium with platform entry into retail, and (3 …