actions is perfect (perfect monitoring), noisy but public (public monitoring), and noisy and private (private monitoring). We … treatments. Specifically, we observe that the strategies are more complex under public and private monitoring than under perfect … monitoring. We also find that the strategies under private monitoring are more lenient than under perfect monitoring, and less …

structures - perfect, imperfect public, and imperfect private - communication boosts efficiency. However, under imperfect … understood. We study cooperation under different monitoring and communication structures in the laboratory. Under all monitoring … monitoring, where actions can only be observed with noise, cooperation is stable only when subjects can communicate before every …

structures - perfect, imperfect public, and imperfect private - communication boosts efficiency. However, under imperfect … understood. We study cooperation under different monitoring and communication structures in the laboratory. Under all monitoring … monitoring, where actions can only be observed with noise, cooperation is stable only when subjects can communicate before every …

We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The 'TASP …

We report laboratory experiments that use new, visually oriented software to explore the dynamics of 3 x 3 games with …

experiments that support many aspects of this theory. …

We use experiments to analyze what type of communication is most effective in achieving cooperation in a simple …

We report experiments designed to test the theoretical possibility, first discovered by Shapley (1964), that in some …

We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP …