Showing 1 - 10 of 178
In this paper we consider the effect of quantity restrictions and scrutiny on the consumption of quasi-free goods. A good is quasi-free if it is zero priced, but it is consumed in the context of a social setting (e.g., as an employee, client, friend, etc.). Examples include cookies at a picnic,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011198451
In this paper we consider the effect of quantity restrictions and scrutiny on the consumption of quasi-free goods. A good is quasi-free if it is zero priced, but it is consumed in the context of a social setting (e.g., as an employee, client, friend, etc.). Examples include cookies at a picnic,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487068
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011584241
In this paper we consider the effect of quantity restrictions and scrutiny on the consumption of quasi-free goods. A good is quasi-free if it is zero priced, but it is consumed in the context of a social setting (e.g., as an employee, client, friend, etc.). Examples include cookies at a picnic,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013027021
This paper analytically investigates the incentive scheme of perpetrators of violent conflicts. It provides a rational equilibrium framework to elicit how monetary incentives and survival considerations shape a combatant’s decision to participate in a conflict. In the model, a leader decides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009366336
This paper analytically investigates the incentive scheme of perpetrators of violent conflicts. It provides a rational equilibrium framework to elicit how monetary incentives and survival considerations shape a combatant’s decision to participate in a conflict. In the model, a leader decides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009251376
This paper analytically investigates the incentive scheme of perpetrators of violent conflicts. It provides a rational equilibrium framework to elicit how monetary incentives and survival considerations shape a combatant’s decision to participate in a conflict. In the model, a leader decides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014042370
Wage secrecy is common in many cultures, especially in highly competitive markets. This paper examines why people in a society honor the wage taboo and explains the role of the secrecy norm in a growing-inequality economy. Assuming that people do take their relative position on the pay ladder...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012715379
This study presents a general model of conspicuous consumption in which two partly visible goods serve as a signal of dual unobserved individual attributes (wealth and wisdom). In addition to a classic Veblen good, a more sophisticated cultural conspicuous-consumption good is introduced. Agents'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012715544
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001127964