This paper exploits variation in the number of bidders to separately identify the valuation distribution and the bidders' belief about the valuation distribution in first-price auctions with independent private values. Exploiting variation in auction volume the result is extended to environments...

We study the identification and estimation of first-price auctions with independent private values if bidders face ambiguity about the valuation distribution and have maxmin expected utility. Using variation in the number of bidders we nonparametrically identify the true valuation distribution...

In laboratory experiments bidding in first-price auctions is more aggressive than predicted by the risk-neutral Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (RNBNE) - a finding known as the overbidding puzzle. Several models have been proposed to explain the overbidding puzzle, but no canonical alternative to...

This paper studies the inference problem of an infinite‐dimensional parameter with a shape restriction. This parameter is identified by arbitrarily many unconditional moment equalities. The shape restriction leads to a convex restriction set. I propose a test of the shape restriction, which...

This working paper was written by Chao Gu (University of Missouri), Guido Menzio (New York University and NBER), Randall Wright (Zhejiang University, University of Wisconsin - Madison and NBER) and Yu Zhu (Bank of Canada).During the financial crisis, relatively centralized markets functioned...