We model the consequences of parental control over choice of wives for sons, for parental incentives to educate daughters, when the marriage market exhibits competitive dowry payments and altruistic but paternalistic parents benefit from having married sons live with them. By choosing uneducated...

We unify and expand the theory of consumer’s behavior, based on Samuelson’s Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, to permit simultaneously both random choice and non-singleton choice sets. We provide a consistency postulate for demand behavior when such behavior is represented in terms of a...

Wealthy individuals often voluntarily provide public goods that the poor also consume. Such philanthropy is perceived as legitimizing one’s wealth. Governments routinely exempt the rich from taxation on grounds of their charitable expenditure. We examine the normative logic of this exemption....

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We develop a model of regulation of service-delivery NGOs, where future grants are conditional on prior spending of some minimal proportion of current revenue on direct project-related expenses. Such regulation induces some NGOs to increase current project spending, but imposes wasteful costs of...

Lenders condition future loans on some index of past performance. Typically, banks condition future loans on repayments of earlier obligations, whilst international organizations (official lenders) condition future loans on the implementation of some policy action (iinvestmentj). We build an...

Much of the existing literature on the use of informal credit arrangements such as ROSCAs (Rotating and Credit Saving Associations) theorises the use of such institutions as arising from market failures in the development of formal saving and credit mechanisms. As economic development proceeds,...