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Single versus multiple randomization in matching mechanisms

Schmelzer, André - 2016

This paper experimentally studies an essential institutional feature of matching markets: Randomization of allocation … priorities. I compare single and multiple randomization in the student assignment problem with ties. The Gale-Shapley deferred … result is that a significant fraction of individuals prefers multiple to single randomization, although both are equivalent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011478678

Single versus multiple randomization in matching mechanisms

Schmelzer, André - In: Essays on market design and regulation under bounded …, (pp. 1-30). 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011900999

School choice and loss aversion

Meisner, Vincent; Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2021

Evidence suggests that participants in direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanisms (DA) play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria in DA. We find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698801

School choice and loss aversion

Meisner, Vincent; Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2019

Extensive evidence suggests that participants in the direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism (DSPDA) play dominated strategies. In particular, students with low priority tend to misrepresent their preferences for popular schools. To explain the observed data, we introduce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138798

Protecting unsophisticated applicants in school choice through information disclosure

Basteck, Christian; Mantovani, Marco - 2016

Unsophisticated applicants can be at a disadvantage under manipulable and hence strategically demanding school choice mechanisms. Disclosing information on applications in previous admission periods makes it easier to asses the chances of being admitted at a particular school, and hence may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544967

Cognitive ability and games of school choice

Basteck, Christian; Mantovani, Marco - 2016

We take school admission mechanisms to the lab to test whether the widely-used manipulable Boston-mechanism disadvantages students of lower cognitive ability and whether this leads to ability segregation across schools. Results show this is the case: lower ability participants receive lower...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544973

Protecting unsophisticated applicants in school choice through information disclosure

Basteck, Christian; Mantovani, Marco - 2016

Unsophisticated applicants can be at a disadvantage under manipulable and hence strategically demanding school choice mechanisms. Disclosing information on applications in previous admission periods makes it easier to assess the chances of being admitted at a particular school, and hence may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011477310