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Competencia política, empleo burocrático y eficiencia en la provisión de bienes públicos: un modelo formal

Gatica, Leonardo A.; Soto, Soto , Georgina - In: Revista Nicolaita de Estudios Económicos II (2007) 2, pp. 97-118

This paper explores how goverment performance, in the sense of efficiency on the provision of public goods and the size of bureaucracy, is affected by political competition. In contrast with other arguments that sustain there is a positive relationship between political competition and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509679

Political Competition and Bureaucratic Employment: A Formal Analysis of the Inefficiency in the Provision of Public Goods

Arreola, Leonardo A. Gatica; Sotomayor, Georgina Soto - In: Economía Mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA XXI (2012) 2, pp. 351-372

This paper presents a formal model to explore the effect of political competition on government performance relative to the efficient provision of public goods and the size of bureaucracy. In contrast with other arguments that sustain there is a positive relationship between political...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010607626

Bureaucracy and Efficiency in the Provision of Public Goods: a Spatial Model of Political Competition

Gatica, Leonardo; Soto, Georgina - In: Lecturas de Economía (2010) 73, pp. 67-97

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008852453

Political Accountability and Real Authority of Government Bureaucracy

Dodlova, Marina - 2013

In a country with weak institutional constraints on the executive, the real power might belong to the government bureaucracy rather than to an autocratic leader. We combine the Aghion-Tirole definition of formal and real authority with the Barro-Ferejohn model of political agency to study the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328834

Political Accountability and Real Authority of Government Bureaucracy

Dodlova, Marina - CESifo - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010703422

Political accountability and real authority of government bureaucracy

Dodlova, Marina - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010199719

Inequality, infrastructure, and institutions: Empirical studies in public economics and political economy

Dorn, Florian - 2021

Florian Dorn prepared this study during his doctoral studies at the Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich (LMU). The study was completed in September 2020 and accepted as doctoral thesis by the Department of Economics. This dissertation contributes to the empirics of public economics and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013164116

Inequality, infrastructure, and institutions : empirical studies in public economics and political economy

Dorn, Florian - 2021

Florian Dorn erstellte diesen Beitrag während seines Promotionsstudiums an der Universität München (LMU). Die Studie wurde im September 2020 abgeschlossen und von der Fakultät für Volkswirtschaftslehre als Dissertation angenommen. Die Dissertation trägt zur Empirie der Ökonomie des...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012807266

Clientelism and development: is there a poverty trap?

Stokes, Susan Carol - 2021

There are sound theoretical reasons to expect clientelism to suppress economic growth: politicians who garner support … constraint is met with low wages. Hence, clientelism can become a poverty trap. Yet in many countries, the heyday of political … clientelism coincided with periods of rapid economic growth. I offer preliminary evidence of this coincidence of clientelism and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012545663

Bogotá: the collapse of a political machine

Santos, Rafael - UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE - 2007

In Bogotá the 1991 reforms obstructed a market for votes. Clientelism lost itseffectiveness; citizens developed a vote … structural break caused by the reforms. Prior to 1991, the areas with the most exposure to clientelism generated a greater …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014520