We introduce a new mechanism for matching students to schools or universities, denoted Iterative Deferred Acceptance …), the matching that is produced is the Student Optimal Stable Matching. Moreover, under imperfect information, students … Mechanism (IDAM), inspired by procedures currently being used to match millions of students to public universities in Brazil and …

We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets. We survey the articles on discrete … admissions model where both schools and students are strategic agents, the school placement model where only students are … strategic agents and they induce an endogenous priority structure of schools over students, and finally the school choice model …

2013. Costly mistakes have externalities: they transfer tuition waivers from high- to low-socioeconomic status students …, and increase the number of students attending college. To shed light on the mechanisms underlying mistakes, we exploit a …

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin … compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a … the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism …

We run laboratory experiments where subjects are matched to colleges, and colleges are not strategic agents. We test … the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching … provided while students make choices. We consider two variations of IDAM: one in which they are only informed about whether …

We investigate fairness preferences in matching mechanisms using a spectator design. Participants choose between the …

the students under the Boston mechanism, and that the Nash equilibrium outcomes in undominated strategies of the induced … game are stable, rely crucially on two assumptions. First, (a) that schools need to be restricted to find all students … acceptable, and (b) that students cannot observe the priorities set by the schools before submitting their preferences. We show …

We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking … students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of …, we solve and compare the equilibria of "centralized college admissions" (CCA) in which students apply to all colleges …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams …. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of “centralized college … admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to …