This paper compares the extent of common ownership in the US and the EU stock markets, with a particular focus on differences in the applicable ownership transparency requirements. Most empirical research on common ownership to date has focused on US issuers, largely relying on ownership data...

Previous work on exit in declining industries has neglected mergers. We examine a simple model that predicts which declining industries experience horizontal mergers. Mergers are more likely if 1) market concentration is high; 2) the inverse demand curve is steep at high levels of output and...

Previous work on exit in declining industries has neglected mergers. We examine a simple model that predicts which declining industries experience horizontal mergers. Mergers are more likely if 1) market concentration is high; 2) the inverse demand curve is steep at high levels of output and...

Die Monopolkommission kommt in ihrem aktuellen Gutachten zu dem Ergebnis, dass indirekte Horizontalverflechtungen zwischen Unternehmen desselben Marktes über institutionelle Investoren ein wettbewerbsverzerrendes Potenzial bilden. Durch Minderheitsbeteiligungen institutioneller Anleger an...

Weltweit diskutieren Wissenschaftler und Politiker sowie Vertreter von Wettbewerbsbehörden und Finanzmarktregulierern die Bedeutung indirekter Unternehmensverflechtungen über institutionelle Anleger für den Wettbewerb zwischen den verflochtenen Unternehmen. Das Risikopotenzial ergibt sich...

Weltweit diskutieren Wissenschaftler und Politiker sowie Vertreter von Wettbewerbsbehörden und Finanzmarktregulierern die Bedeutung indirekter Unternehmensverflechtungen über institutionelle Anleger für den Wettbewerb zwischen den verflochtenen Unternehmen. Das Risikopotenzial ergibt sich...

Previous work on exit in declining industries has neglected mergers. We examine a simple model that predicts which declining industries experience horizontal mergers. Mergers are more likely if 1) market concentration is high; 2) the inverse demand curve is steep at high levels of output and...

Horizontal shareholding exists when significant shareholders have stock in horizontal competitors. (It is often imprecisely called "common shareholding," but that term can also apply when shareholders own stock in two noncompeting corporations. It differs from "cross-shareholding," which...

This Article shows that new economic proofs and empirical evidence provide powerful confirmation that, even when horizontal shareholders individually have minority stakes, horizontal shareholding in concentrated markets often has anticompetitive effects. The new economic proofs show that,...

Empirical evidence that horizontal shareholding has created anticompetitive effects in airline and banking markets have produced calls for antitrust enforcement. In response, others have critiqued the airline and banking studies and argued that antitrust law cannot tackle any anticompetitive...