In a 2-country and 3-period OLG model with education, we study the impact on international migration of the two sided characteristics of borders. Individuals must first "leave" their home country before "entering" the destination country. Indeed, each social planner chooses the static welfare...

In a 2-country monetary union, this paper studies a Stackelberg game be- tween the Central Banker and two symmetrical countries. The central banker chooses the money supply. In each country, there is a union who acts as a monopoly of labor supply. Firms are wage and price takers. We analyze the...

Search models with wage posting and match-specific heterogeneity generate wage dispersion. Given K values for the match-specific variable, it is known that there are K reservation wages that could be posted, but generically never more than two actually are posted in equilibrium. What is unknown...

This paper presents a two-country migration model, following Galor (1986), in which the world population consists of two types individuals. Individuals with a high (low) degree of altruism give to their children a high (low) level of bequest. Production uses three inputs: immobile land, mobile...

This paper investigates the effect of altruism on the pattern of labour migration in a two-country overlapping generations model. We show that differences in degrees of altruism across countries lead to bilateral migration flows. Starting from the autarkic steady-state equilibrium, restrictions...

In a 2-country monetary union, this paper studies a Stackelberg game be- tween the Central Banker and two symmetrical countries. The central banker chooses the money supply. In each country, there is a union who acts as a monopoly of labor supply. Firms are wage and price takers. We analyze the...

We study incentive-compatible labour contracts in the case where individual productivity, preference for leisure and time preference rate are unobservable by the principal in a two-period model. We first reduce this three-dimensional problem to a standard one-dimensional screening problem....