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Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces

Ambrus, Attila; Takahashi, Satoru - In: Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) 1, pp. 1-27

This paper analyzes multi-sender cheap talk when the state space might be restricted, either because the policy space is restricted, or the set of rationalizable policies of the receiver is not the whole space. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fully...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599396

Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces

Ambrus, Attila; Takahashi, Satoru - In: Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) 1

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812749

Strategic communication : an experimental investigation

Eckartz, Katharina; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - 2014

other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs … communication is less biased. In all treatments, however, the messages are more precise than theoretically predicted. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085

Communication in cournot oligopoly

Goltsman, Maria; Pavlov, Gregory - 2012

We study communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private … can communicate through a third party, communication can be informative even when it is not substantiated by any … commitment or costly actions. We exhibit a simple mechanism that ensures informative communication and interim Pareto dominates …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009633349

Cheap talk with correlated signals

Chand, A. K. S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2013

informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189326

Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games

Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2015

In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477113

The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback : theory and experimental evidence

Ertac, Seda; Koçkesen, Levent; Özdemir, Duygu - 2015

We theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of verifiability and privacy in strategic performance feedback using a “one principal-two agent” context with real effort. We confirm the theoretical prediction that information transmission occurs only in verifiable feedbackmechanisms and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011389425

Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap‐talk games

Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1453-1487

We design experimental games to evaluate the predictive power of the first cheap‐talk refinement, neologism‐proofness. In our first set of treatments designed to evaluate the refinement with its usual emphasis on literal meanings, we find that a fully revealing equilibrium that is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011994751

Cheap talk with correlated signals

Chand, A. K. S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2015

informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011774610

Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer

Sadakane, Hiroshi - 2017

We examine multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, an informed expert can send messages to an uninformed decision maker more than once, and the uninformed decision maker can pay money to the informed expert...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671657