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The economics of collective negotiation in pretrial bargaining
Che, Yeon-Koo - In: International economic review 43 (2002) 2, pp. 549-575
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001680496
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A dynamic theory of holdup
Che, Yeon-Koo (contributor); Sákovics, József (contributor) - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001656884
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Asymmetric information about rivals ́types in standard auctions
Kim, Jinwoo; Che, Yeon-Koo - In: Games and economic behavior 46 (2004) 2, pp. 383-397
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001889762
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Contractual remedies to the holdup problem : a dynamic perspective
Che, Yeon-Koo (contributor); Sákovics, József (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001949998
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Collusion-proof implementation of optimal mechanisms
Che, Yeon-Koo (contributor); Kim, Jinwoo (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001950005
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A dynamic theory of holdup
Che, Yeon-Koo; Sákovics, József - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 72 (2004) 4, pp. 1063-1103
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002132524
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Optimal incentives for teams : comment
Ishiguro, Shingo - In: The American economic review 92 (2002) 5, pp. 1711
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001731460
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Competitive procurement with corruption
Burguet, Roberto; Che, Yeon-Koo - In: The Rand journal of economics 35 (2004) 1, pp. 50-68
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002079749
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Asymmetric information about rivals ́types in standard auctions : an experiment
Andreoni, James (contributor); Che, Yeon-Koo (contributor);  … - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002740495
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Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila; Che, Yeon-Koo; Yasuda, Yosuke - 2009
Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014212489