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A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets

Lavi, Ron; May, Marina - In: Economics Letters 115 (2012) 1, pp. 100-103

We show that any deterministic mechanism, for allocating identical items that are complements to budget-constrained bidders, cannot simultaneously satisfy individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency, and no-positive-transfers. This holds even for two bidders, two items, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572199

Two simplified proofs for Roberts’ theorem

Lavi, Ron; Mu’alem, Ahuva; Nisan, Noam - In: Social choice and welfare 32 (2009) 3, pp. 407-424

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008170130

Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation

Bikhchandani, Sushil; Chatterji, Shurojit; Lavi, Ron; … - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 74 (2006) 4, pp. 1109-1132

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007266965

Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms

Ashlagi, Itai; Dobzinski, Shahar; Lavi, Ron - In: Mathematics of operations research 37 (2012) 2, pp. 244-259

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009973909

Multi-unit auctions with budget limits

Dobzinski, Shahar; Lavi, Ron; Nisan, Noam - In: Games and economic behavior 74 (2012) 2, pp. 486-504

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009830633

A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets

Lavi, Ron; May, Marina - In: Economics letters 115 (2012) 1, pp. 100-104

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009838642

Position auctions with budgets : existence and uniqueness

Ashlagi, Itai; Braverman, Mark; Hassidim, Avinatan; … - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 10 (2010) 1, pp. 1-30

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010007673

Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case

Lavi, Ron; Oren, Sigal - In: Games and economic behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 439-457

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010028204

Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity

Lavi, Ron; Swamy, Chaitanya - In: Games and economic behavior 67 (2009) 1, pp. 99-124

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008283865

Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity

Lavi, Ron; Swamy, Chaitanya - In: Games and economic behavior 67 (2009) 1, pp. 99-125

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008850218