Similar Search Results

Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment : its evolution

Sasaki, Tatsuya; Okada, Isamu; Uchida, Satoshi; Chen, … - In: Games 6 (2015) 4, pp. 574-587

in terms of evolutionary game theory. Based on the dilemmatic donation game, we introduce a strategy of commitment to … both cooperation and peer punishment. To make the commitment credible, we assume that those willing to commit have to make … punish free riders and non-committers. It turns out that the deposit-based commitment offers both the efficiency of peer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383961

Pool punishment in public goods games : how do sanctioners' incentives affect us?

Alventosa, Adriana; Antonioni, Alberto; Hernández, … - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 185 (2021), pp. 513-537

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012601328

Rich and poor : On the emergence of a sanctioning institution

Alventosa, Adriana; Olcina Vauteren, Gonzalo - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 177 (2021) 1, pp. 56-80

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012807200

Trigger-happy or precisionist? On demand for monitoring in a noisy social dilemma game

Nicklisch, Andreas; Putterman, Louis G.; Thöni, Christian - 2019

Recent experimental studies question whether societies can selfgovern social dilemmas with the help of decentralized punishment opportunities. One important challenge for the mechanism is imperfect information about cooperative behavior. It has been shown that imperfect information increases...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012058649

Flexible Microcredit: Effects on Loan Repayment and Social Pressure

Czura, Kristina; John, Anett; Spantig, Lisa - 2020

Flexible repayment schedules allow borrowers to invest in profitable yet risky projects, but practitioners fear they erode repayment morale. We study repayment choices in rigid and flexible loan contracts that allow discretion in repayment timing. To separate strategic repayment choices from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227662

Peer-punishment in a cooperation and a coordination game

Albrecht, Felix; Kube, Sebastian - In: Games 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1-13

We elicit individual-level peer-punishment types in a cooperation (social dilemma) and a coordination (weakest link) problem. In line with previous literature, we find heterogeneity in peer-punishment in both environments. Comparing punishment behavior across the two environments within subject,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227709

Conditional punishment: Descriptive social norms drive negative reciprocity

Li, Xueheng; Molleman, Lucas; Van Dolder, Dennie - 2020

Is punishment of free riders driven by descriptive social norms of cooperation and punishment? We conduct experiments in which participants interact in a one-shot social dilemma with punishment. We study how punishment of free riders is influenced by behavior among members of a payoff-irrelevant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012389694

Self-governance in generalized exchange. a laboratory experiment on the structural embeddedness of peer punishment

Kanitsar, Georg - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-16

Peer punishment is widely lauded as a decentralized solution to the problem of social cooperation. However, experimental evidence of its effectiveness primarily stems from public good structures. This paper explores peer punishment in another structural setting: a system of generalized exchange....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200112

How does income inequality affect cooperation and punishment in public good settings?

Prediger, Sebastian - 2011

In the frame of decentralization reforms in Namibia, local water point associations evolved that have to collect water fees from community members to cover maintenance costs. Enforcement, however, is weak and water point associations have to rely on moral pleas. As a consequence, several users...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286416

Strategies of cooperation and punishment among students and clerical workers

Bigoni, Maria; Camera, Gabriele; Casari, Marco - 2012

We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291472