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We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. We first provide an algorithm that characterizes the unique pairwise and groupwise farsightedly stable set of networks under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule. We then show that this set coincides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369402
The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on the choice of messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of agents has a profitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491446
We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch's (Games and Economic Behavior,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279419
Evidence suggests that in developing countries, agents rely on mutual insurance agreements to deal with income or expenditure shocks. This paper analyzes which risk-sharing networks can be sustained in the long run when individuals are farsighted, in the sense that they are able to forecast how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010949638
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010926297
The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on the choice of messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of agents has a profitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010937981
We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch’s (Games and Economic Behavior,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008046
Curb sets [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991), 141-146] are product sets of pure strategies containing all individual best-responses against beliefs restricted to the recommendations to the remaining players. The concept of minimal curb sets is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550176