This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where: (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant...

This paper considers the optimal design of dynamic research contests when the buyer can set time-dependent prizes. We derive the buyer-optimal contest and show that it entails an increasing prize schedule. Remarkably, this allows the buyer to implement a global stopping rule. In particular, the...

With infinite horizon, optimal rules for sequential search from a known distribution feature a constant reservation value that is independent of whether recall of past options is possible. We extend this result to the the case when there are multiple distributions to choose from: it is optimal...

This paper considers the optimal design of dynamic research tournaments when the buyer can set time-dependent prizes. We derive the buyer-optimal tournament and show that it entails an increasing prize schedule. Remarkably, this allows the buyer to implement a global stopping rule. In...

We provide a model of investment in innovation that is dynamic, features multiple heterogeneous research projects of which only one potentially leads to success, and in each period, the researcher chooses the set of projects to invest in. We show that if a search for innovation starts, it...

We present a model of startup acquisitions, which may give rise to inefficient "talent hoarding." We develop a model with two competing firms that can acquire and integrate (or "acquihire") a startup operating in an orthogonal market. Such an acquihire improves the competitiveness of the...

This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where: (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant...

We present a model of startup acquisitions, which may give rise to inefficient "talent hoarding." We develop a model with two competing firms that can acquire and integrate (or "acquihire") a startup operating in an orthogonal market. Such an acquihire improves the competitiveness of the...

We provide a model of investment in innovation that is dynamic, features multiple heterogeneous research projects of which only one potentially leads to success, and in each period, the researcher chooses the set of projects to invest in. We show that if a search for innovation starts, it...

This paper considers the optimal design of dynamic research contests when the buyer can set time-dependent prizes. We derive the buyer-optimal contest and show that it entails an increasing prize schedule. Remarkably, this allows the buyer to implement a global stopping rule. In particular, the...