Based on detailed regulatory intervention data among German banks during 1994-2008, we test if supervisory measures affect the likelihood and the timing of bank recovery. Severe regulatory measures increase both the likelihood of recovery and its duration while weak measures are insignificant....

The Italian and German banking systems shared similar characteristics early in the 1990s but have evolved in different directions since then: Italy privatized its publicly-owned banks while Germany has maintained a large share of state-owned savings banks. Contemporaneously, banks in both...

The World Financial Crisis has shaken the fundamentals of international banking and triggered a downward spiral of asset prices. To prevent a further meltdown of markets, governments have intervened massively through rescues measures aimed at recapitalizing banks and through liquidity support....

We identify the connections between financial institutions from different sectors of the financial industry based on joint extreme movements in credit default swap (CDS) spreads. First, we estimate pairwise co-crash probabilities (CCP) to identify significant connections among 193 international...

We exploit a unique sample to analyze how homophily (affinity for similar others) and social ties affect career outcomes in banking. We test if these factors increase the probability that the appointee to an executive board is an outsider without previous employment at the bank compared to being...

We exploit election-driven turnover in State and local governments in Germany to study how banks adjust their securities portfolios in response to the loss of political connections. We find that local savings banks, which are owned by their host county and supervised by local politicians,...

We test whether limited market discipline imposes exit barriers and poor profitability in banking. We exploit an exogenous shock to the governance of governmen-owned banks: the unification of counties. County mergers lead to enforced governmen-owned bank mergers. We compare forced to voluntary...

Theoretically, bank's loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalization. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers' investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the fi rm. Exploiting granular bank-fi rm...

We show that the presence of executive directors with prior experience in the finance industry is pervasive on the boards of European national banking supervisors. Up to one executive out of three has previously held positions in the industry she supervises (or in closely connected ones)....