We show that politically connected banks influence economic activity. We exploit shocks to individual banks’ political capital following close US congressional elections. We find that regional output growth increases when banks active in the region experience an average positive shock to their...

We study how lobbying affects the resolution of failed banks, using a sample of FDIC auctions between 2007 and 2014. We show that bidding banks that lobby regulators have a higher probability of winning an auction. In addition, the FDIC incurs higher costs in such auctions, amounting to 16.4...

Documenting the US antitrust review process for M&As in detail, we unveil that regulatory costs and risks are significant and that mitigating these risks via lobbying by acquirers may benefit shareholders. Our results show that an adverse antitrust review outcome leads to a decline of 2.8...

We study how lobbying affects the resolution of failed banks. Using a sample of FDIC auctions between 2007 and 2016, we find that bidding banks that lobby regulators have a higher probability of winning an auction. However, the FDIC incurs larger costs in such auctions, amounting to 18.4 percent...

We study how lobbying affects the resolution of failed banks, using a sample of FDIC auctions between 2007 and 2014. We show that bidding banks that lobby regulators have a higher probability of winning an auction. In addition, the FDIC incurs higher costs in such auctions, amounting to 16.4...