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Sequential aggregation of verifiable information

Hahn, Volker - 2010 - This version: September 2010

We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by … career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold … phenomenon, and the probability of the correct state of the world being revealed always converges to one as the group of experts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008748176

Sequential aggregation of verifiable information

Hahn, Volker - In: Journal of public economics 95 (2011) 11/12, pp. 1447-1454

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009424158

When second opinions hurt : a model of expert advice under career concerns

Liu, Yaozhou Franklin; Sanyal, Amal - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 84 (2012) 1, pp. 1-16

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009697942

Careerist experts and political incorrectness

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 120 (2015), pp. 1-18

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011572850

Individual accountability, collective decision-making

Gibbs, Daniel - In: Constitutional political economy 34 (2023) 4, pp. 524-552

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014393437

Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information

Hahn, Volker - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753200

An Experimental Study of Career Concerns in Groups

Wei, Chen - 2022

predictions. For example, workers allocate more effort to support others in the experiment than that in theory. We apply the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014242527

Regulatory capture by sophistication : conference paper

Hakenes, Hendrik; Schnabel, Isabel - 2013

One explanation for the poor performance of regulation in the recent financial crisis is that regulators had been captured by the financial sector. We present a micro-founded model with rational agents in which banks may capture regulators due to their high degree of sophistication. Banks can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338301

Public versus secret voting in committees

Mattozzi, Andrea; Nakaguma, Marcos Yamada - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013257171

Committee design with endogenous participation

Hahn, Volker - In: Games and economic behavior 102 (2017), pp. 388-408

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011792169