Showing 1 - 10 of 83
We analyze bargaining mechanisms for allocating resources in atomless econo- mies. We provide results proving that it is not necessary to consider the forma- tion of all coalitions in order to obtain the bargaining sets. This is shown under restrictions of different nature, triggering different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015232450
We consider consumers with the same reservation price, who desire to buy at most one unit of a good. Firms compete only in prices but there are other features firms cannot control that would eventually lead an agent to buy in one firm or another. We introduce such uncertainty in a model of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015246416
We define a bargaining set for finite economies using Aubin’s veto mechanism and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations. Then, we rewrite our notion in terms of replicated economies showing that, in contrast with Anderson, Trockel and Zhou’s (1997) non-convergence result,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015246417
We give a notion of bargaining set for finite economies and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations. Moreover, we also show that justified objections equate with Walrasian objections. Our bargaining-Walras equivalence provides a discrete approach to the characterization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015250997
We introduce a new notion of bargaining set for finite economies and show a convergence result.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015251005
We analyze bargaining mechanisms for allocating resources in atomless econo- mies. We provide results proving that it is not necessary to consider the forma- tion of all coalitions in order to obtain the bargaining sets. This is shown under restrictions of different nature, triggering different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107345
We consider consumers with the same reservation price, who desire to buy at most one unit of a good. Firms compete only in prices but there are other features firms cannot control that would eventually lead an agent to buy in one firm or another. We introduce such uncertainty in a model of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011183537
We define a bargaining set for finite economies using Aubin’s veto mechanism and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations. Then, we rewrite our notion in terms of replicated economies showing that, in contrast with Anderson, Trockel and Zhou’s (1997) non-convergence result,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011183541
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946639
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011641852