Using a public-policy application of Tullock's two-player rent-seeking contest, this paper focuses on the relationship between the aggregate expected utility of the players and their asymmetric valuations. In our game these valuations are the players' payoffs in the two possible states of...

We study the social allocation of resources to the alteration of preferences. Such taste changes are Pareto-preferred if, according to both the original and the new taste regime, the resource allocation resulting from the taste change constitutes an improvement. According to this criterion, a...

Rationality implies that adding 'irrelevant' and, in particular, inferior alternatives to the opportunity set cannot increase the choice probability of some other alternative. In this study, we propose a novel approach that can rationalize an intended addition of such alternatives because it...

In this paper we analyze the endogenous determination of migration quota viewing it as an outcome of a two-stage political struggle between two interest groups: those in favor and those against the proposed migration quota. We first compare the proposed policies of the two interest groups under...

In this paper we study the endogenous determination of minimum wage employing a political-economic game-theoretic approach. A major objective of the paper is to clarify the crucial role of the strength of the workers’ union and of political culture on the determination of the minimum wage. In...

The primary objective of this paper is to examine the role of differential sharing rules within a collective rent-seeking setting on the possible nonexistence of Nash equilibrium. Focusing on groups that distribute part of the rent equally among their members and the residual according to...