advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter …-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of … effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important …

disadvantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to freeride is larger in inter …-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is fiercer. Both effects lower the marginal utility of effort … provision. We test our model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important …

advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter …-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intradivisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of … effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important …

advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter …-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intradivisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of … effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important …

advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter …-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of … effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important …

disadvantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to freeride is larger in inter …-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is fiercer. Both effects lower the marginal utility of effort … provision. We test our model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important …

advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter …-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of … effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important …

advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter …-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intradivisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of … effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important …

potentially divisible resource. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three resource allocation … contests which are isomorphic under risk-neutrality. The results indicate that in aggregate the single-prize contest generates … lower expenditures than either the proportional-prize or the multi-prize contest. Interestingly, while the aggregate results …

This study reports an experiment that examines whether groups can better comply with theoretical predictions than … individuals in contests. Our experiment replicates previous findings that individual players significantly overbid relative to … individual players. The new findings of our experiment are that groups make 25% lower bids, their bids have lower variance, and …