Showing 1 - 10 of 67,400
confirm these hypotheses in the experiment. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012150752
We show that it is beneficial for a buyer to conduct a multi-stage mechanism if bidders are loss averse. In a first step, we derive a revenue equivalence principle. Fixing the multi-stage structure, the revenue is independent of the chosen payment rule. Secondly, we introduce a simple two-stage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012146346
In a lab experiment, we analyze the benefits of increasing competition on auction platforms hosting multiple … auctioneers of a homogeneous good. We find that increasing competition by merging separated individual auctions increases market …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014384448
We show that it is beneficial for a buyer to conduct a multi-stage mechanism if bidders are loss averse. In a first step, we derive a revenue equivalence principle. Fixing the multi-stage structure, the revenue is independent of the chosen payment rule. Secondly, we introduce a simple two-stage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012146978
The Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) has frequently been used in recent spectrum auctions. It combines a dynamic clock …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158791
concealing the scoring rule affected buyers. Using an experiment, we analyze the effect of transparently communicating the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012846401
We experimentally implement security-bid auctions, which are used around the world to sell projects that generate large …-post revenue. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, we find that debt auctions generate more revenue than equity auctions. This … is explained by overbidding in debt auctions. Furthermore, we find that second-price equity auctions generate slightly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013403333
behavior in an environment with repeated auctions, pivotal suppliers and inelastic demand. The price increase can be traced … back to an abuse of the auction’s pay-as-bid mechanism by the two largest firms. In contrast to theoretical findings, we … show that pay-as-bid auctions do not necessarily reduce incentives for strategic capacity withholding and collusive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751726
In auction and mechanism design, Myerson's classical regularity condition is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper introduces L-regularity as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402720
In mechanism design, Myerson regularity is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper therefore explores the quantitative version of Myerson...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011406392