Cryptocurrency systems based on proof of stake (PoS) grant governance rights to the holders of currency tokens and therefore are vulnerable to attack by adversaries who buy tokens in order to gain control. To evaluate the robustness of PoS cryptocurrencies to such attacks, we model the market...

New, “big” data sources allow measurement of city characteristics and outcome variables higher frequencies and finer geographic scales than ever before. However, big data will not solve large urban social science questions on its own. Big data has the most value for the study of cities when...

This is an Online Appendix to accompany: “Troll” Check? A Proposal for Administrative Review of Patent Litigation (Cohen, Golden, Gurun, and Kominers (2017)), published in the Boston University Law Review

We show that charging entry fees can sometimes dominate the benefit of recruiting additional bidders to auctions, even though the fees themselves implicitly reduce competition at the auction stage. We also highlight that admission fees and reserve prices are different instruments in a setting...

Holdout problems prevent decentralized aggregation of complementary goods, but the coercion required to overcome holdout may encourage abuse and violate fairness standards. We propose second-best efficiency, abuse-prevention, and fairness criteria for procedures intended to reduce holdout. Our...

We consider securities markets in which economic interests in firms and shareholder voting rights are traded independently; such markets allow for "empty voters" who hold voting rights in a firm that exceed their economic interests. We demonstrate that, in such settings, competitive equilibria...

This appendix to "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms" (available at 'https://ssrn.com/abstract=3120463' https://ssrn.com/abstract=3120463) contains a proof of the sufficiency result (Theorem 4) in Section 3 and all proofs for Section 4