Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Motivating Example -- 1.2 Collusion within Porter's Five Forces -- 1.3 Difficulties of Collusion -- 1.4 Environments Requiring Explicit Collusion -- 1.5 Lingering Price Effects of Explicit Collusion -- 1.6 Price Formation Process --...

We consider the dynamic private provision of funds to projects that generate public benefits. Participants have complete information about the environment, but imperfect information about individual actions: each period they observe only the aggregate contribution. Each player may contribute any...

We analyze a multiple-activity, principal-agent model in which the activities are naturally substitutable for the agent and complementary for the principal. A basic result is that the optimal compensation must cause the agent to view the activities as complements. This complementarity is...

We analyze a multiple-activity principal-agent model in which the activities are naturally substitutable for the agent and complementary for the principal. A basic result is that the optimal compensation mechanism must cause the agent to view the activities as complements. This complementarity...