We examine a heterogenous goods duopoly model, wherein governments simultaneously and noncooperatively choose whether or not to provide subsidies for their firms and then firms noncooperatively choose output levels, either sequentially or simultaneously. We find that government trade policy and...

We provide a model showing that the use of confidential settlement as a strategy for a firm facing tort litigation leads to lower average safety of products sold than would occur if the firm were committed to openness. A rational risk-neutral consumer's response in a market, wherein a firm...

We model the settlement and litigation process, allowing for incomplete information about the level of damages on the part of both the defendant and the court, and use the model to examine the effect of making (currently inadmissible) settlement demands admissible as evidence in court should a...

In search models, the property of "recall" has heretofore been treated as exogenous, with a distinction made between models with "no recall" and models with "perfect recall." However, an alternative interpretation is that recall is provided by the firms. Then, "perfect recall" corresponds to...

This article uses an infinite-regress model of firm-level decisions to find a rational expectations equilibrium for a duopoly and to relate concepts of conjectural variations and consistency to the Cournot equilibrium. The model derives a conjectural variation instead of assuming it. In...

We explore how the incentives of a plaintiff and her attorney, when considering filing suit and bargaining over settlement, can differ between those suits associated with stand-alone torts cases and those suits involving mass torts. We contrast "individual-based liability determination" (IBLD),...