Showing 1 - 10 of 141,144
majority coalition can be stable, provided that reciprocity is sufficiently strong and widespread. In addition, a stable … minority coalition can exist, even with weak reciprocity preferences. This latter coalition is weakly larger than the maximum … stable coalition with standard preferences, but is characterized by mutually negative sentiments. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010400178
on others' abatement. I show that a full or majority coalition can be stable. This requires, however, that a majority of … countries have relatively strong reciprocity preferences. No coalition participation is always stable. In addition, a stable … minority coalition may exist; if so, it is weakly larger than the maximum stable coalition with standard preferences, but is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010488278
being purely selfish, is usually prevented by the problem of freeriding. Coalitions, in fact, generally fail to be … to guarantee internal stability and to maximize the sum of utilities of coalition members. The transfers scheme is tested … stabilizing coalitions and sensibly increases cooperation compared to the absence of transfers. Furthermore, for high but not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012287274
stable coalitions are easier to be achieved when F&S preferences are assumed, even if the advantageous inequality aversion … parameter (altruism) is assumed to have a very low value. However, self–sustaining coalitions are far from reaching the … heterogene Ungleichheitsaversion zu signifikant mehr freiwilliger Kooperation im Klimaschutz führt. Allerdings kann auch im …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012651070
In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the players differ with respect to their benefits and costs from contributions to a non-linear public good. A necessary condition for contributing to the public good is that the players’ benefit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014178828
In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the players differ with respect to their benefits and costs from contributions to a non-linear public good. A necessary condition for contributing to the public good is that the players’ benefit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009244226
In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the players differ with respect to their benefits and costs from contributions to a non-linear public good. A necessary condition for contributing to the public good is that the players' benefit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306006
&S preferences. Stability of the grand coalition is never reached, but potential internally stable grand coalitions are achieved … eines globalen öffentlichen Gutes – z.B. Klimaschutz - eingeführt. Spieler tragen – wenn sie einer Koalition beitreten … higher levels of cooperation, prevents the formation of stable coalitions. The introduction of other–regarding preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013493119
In this paper we analyze how ratification uncertainty impacts the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We relax the frequent assumption of countries as unitary actors by modeling the ratification stage through uncertain preferences of a ratifying agent (e.g. the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339399
justice claims based on needs than towards culpability may serve as a fruitful starting point to depart from a purely egoistic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010357594