In a global game, I show that creditor bailins, when well-designed, can attain the exact same level of bank stability as costly creditor bailouts. This result holds for both risk-averse and risk-neutral creditors. Because bailouts are costly but do not necessarily provide a stability advantage,...

We analyze a two-country economy with complete markets, featuring two national currencies as well as a global (crypto)currency. If the global currency is used in both countries, the national nominal interest rates must be equal and the exchange rate between the national currencies is a...

Can banks exploit the political economy to generate revenue? If bank creditors (local depositors) are voters, the bank's capital structure can act as a tool to impact the electorate and thus bail-outs by changing the relative group size of voters who favor as opposed to object bailouts.As the...

In an endowment economy, we analyze coexistence and competition between traditional fiat money (Dollar) and cryptocurrency (Bitcoin). Agents can trade consumption goods in either currency or hold on to currency for speculative purposes. A central bank ensures a Dollar inflation target, while...

In a novel model of an endowment economy, we analyze coexistence and competition between traditional fiat money (Dollar) and another intrinsically worthless medium of exchange, not controlled by a central bank, such as Bitcoin. Agents can trade consumption goods in either currency or hold on to...