This appendix provides complete results for the robustness checks discussed in the paper, Non-Pecuniary Benefits: Evidence from the Location of Private Company Sales, found here: 'http://ssrn.com/abstract=2423117' http://ssrn.com/abstract=2423117

Tests of Leland and Pyle's (1977) signaling model in the public setting face a number of empirical challenges. We revisit the implications of their model with new evidence from a setting in which entrepreneurs sell their firms in private transactions. In this setting, it is common for sellers to...

When private firms are acquired, buyers commonly rely on seller financing and earnouts. Using a novel database of private acquisitions, I find that seller financing and earnouts become more common as information asymmetry increases between the acquirer and the target. Financial statement audits...

We propose a security design model in which a potential acquirer approaches a firm with a value-add plan. The target has a single owner, who possesses private information: he knows whether his firm is compatible with the plan, or not. The seller agrees the acquirer will add value but not as much...

Automotive manufacturers are known to use deadline-based convex incentives to motivate dealerships to sell new cars. This paper shows that dealerships respond to these incentive targets by pushing customers from used to new cars as the end of the month approaches, and that subprime loans written...

This appendix provides derivations and additional results for “Seller Debt in Acquisitionsof Private Firms: A Security Design Approach.” Section A provides some background definitions andsimple mathematical identities used in the subsequent sections. Section B provides derivations for those...