We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially-informed students. We show that in general, the commonly-used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse...

We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially informed students. We show that, in general, the commonly used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy‐proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse...

In a Markov game, players engage in a sequence of games determined by a Markov process. In this setting, this paper investigates the impact of varying the informativeness of public information, as defined by Blackwell [8,9], pertaining to the games that will be played in future periods. In...

In the static directed search model, sellers and buyers play a game where sellers post prices, buyers observe the posted prices and approach sellers, and transactions occur between sellers and one of the buyers who approaches them. Even though there are gains to trade, sellers with no...

I experimentally investigate an infinitely repeated market entry game with an informed incumbent firm who knows demand and an uninformed entrant firm who does not. The uninformed firm's profits each period serve as a signal about demand, but the informed firm may signal jam the uninformed firm...

Intrinsic motivation and monetary incentives affect an expert's choice of firm, and thus also the performance of the firm. These effects are particularly important for consumers of credence goods in mission industries, where experts perform duties that align with their own personal belief...