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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014485366
We introduce pollution, as a by-product of production, into a non-tournament model of R&D with spillovers. Technology policy takes the form of either R&D subsidisation or pre-competitive R&D cooperation. We show that, when the emissions tax is exogenous, the optimal R&D subsidy can be negative,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014116482
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001374331
In this paper we show that in a vertically product differentiation model where foreign and domestic firms compete in quantities, both firms respond by lowering their qualities for a restriction at, or close to, the free trade level. Both firms lower qualities, raise prices and earn higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074354
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490557
In a two-tier industry with bottleneck upstream and two downstream firms producing vertically differentiated goods, we identify conditions under which the upstream supplier chooses exclusive or non-exclusive negotiations, or an English auction to sell its essential input. Auctioning off a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012658411
In this paper the authors show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011141898
Double marginalization causes inefficiencies in vertical markets. This paper argues that such inefficiencies may be beneficial to final consumers in markets producing vertically differentiated goods. The rationale behind this result is that enhancing efficiency in high-quality supply chains...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011651715
In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011651762
In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702777