We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two stage game...

The effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good is examined. Participants are in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence, they can select a new partner out of six group...

Among residents of an informal housing area in Cairo, we examine how dictator giving varies by the social distance between subjects – friend versus stranger – and by the anonymity of the dictator. While giving to strangers is high under anonymity, we find – consistent with Leider et al....

We introduce the notion of strategic awareness in experimental games which captures the idea that subjects realize they are playing a game and thus have to form beliefs about others' actions in order to play well. The concept differs from both, rule understanding and rationality. We then turn to...

We study beliefs and actions in a repeated normal-form game. Using a level-k model of limited strategic reasoning and allowing for other-regarding preferences, we classify action and belief choices with regard to their strategic sophistication and study their development over time. In addition...

Contest or auction designers who want to maximize the overall revenue are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of bidders with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the most able bidder in favor of...

Among residents of an informal housing area in Cairo, we examine how dictator giving varies by the social distance between subjects - friend versus stranger - and by the anonymity of the dictator. While giving to strangers is high under anonymity, we find - consistent with Leider et al. (2009) -...

We present an experiment in which extrinsic signals may generate sunspot equilibria. The game has a unique symmetric non-sunspot equilibrium, which is also risk dominant. Other equilibria can be ordered according to risk dominance. By comparing treatments with different information structure, we...