Rebates that reward economic agents if they meet a minimum conservation threshold are a popular policy to encourage energy conservation. However, most threshold-based rebates are structured such that they do not encourage reduction beyond the threshold. In this paper, I show theoretically that...

Firms and governments often use moral suasion and economic incentives to influence intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for economic activities. To investigate persistence of such interventions, we randomly assign households to moral suasion and dynamic pricing that stimulate energy conservation...

As the United States attempts to increase the percentage of no- and low-carbon electricity sources in the fuel mix, one consideration is whether these sources are more expensive or are capable of being competitive in the market without subsidies. This article explores the types of subsidies that...

Many OECD countries such as the USA, the UK or Switzerland are concerned with the affordability of utility services and the distributional consequences inherent in the pricing strategy of basic goods and services, such as electricity. However, the effectiveness of the electricity tariff as a...

Many OECD countries such as the USA, the UK or Switzerland are concerned with the affordability of utility services and the distributional consequences inherent in the pricing strategy of basic goods and services, such as electricity. However, the effectiveness of the electricity tariff as a...

This report reviews the literature on the impact of real-time information provision on consumer decision-making. In addition, it describes the results of a study in which about 7000 households in Ontario, Canada were provided with in-home displays linked to smart meters that provided real-time...

We introduce a framework to evaluate the welfare effects of residential energy efficiency programs and estimate key parameters using a 100,000-household field experiment. Results generally contradict conventional wisdom: there is no evidence of informational or behavioral market failures,...

Imperfect information and inattention to energy costs are important potential motivations for energy efficiency standards and subsidies. We evaluate these motivations in the lightbulb market using a theoretical model and two randomized experiments. We derive welfare effects as functions of...

Time-of-use (TOU) pricing for electricity is an effective means to allocate electricity, though regulators are increasingly employing non-market strategies to provide information and induce conservation. We evaluate a large-scale field trial in which households facing TOU pricing were given an...

Imperfect information and inattention to energy costs are important potential motivations for energy efficiency standards and subsidies. We evaluate these motivations in the lightbulb market using a theoretical model and two randomized experiments. We derive welfare effects as functions of...