This paper investigates the performance of various monetary rules in an open economy with incomplete exchange rate pass-through. Implementing monetary policy through an exchange rate augmented policy rule does not improve social welfare compared to using an optimized Taylor rule, irrespective of...

This paper studies monetary regime choice between monetary union and flexible exchange rate regime in a large open economy framework. The classical approach emphasizes that monetary unions are inherently costly because a single interest rate cannot respond effectively to different shocks of...

This work is based on a new Keynesian theoretical model for an advanced economy, which incorporates overlapping generations to analyze a channel through which fluctuations in household financial wealth influence aggregate demand. The optimal monetary policy, corresponding to that of a central...

The central bank's optimal objective function is analyzed in a small open economy model allowing for incomplete exchange rate pass-through. The results indicate that social welfare can only be marginally improved by including an explicit exchange-rate term in the delegated objective function,...

The performance of various monetary rules is investigated in an open economy with incomplete exchange rate pass-through. Implementing monetary policy through an exchange-rate augmented policy rule does not improve social welfare compared to using an optimized Taylor rule, irrespective of the...

This paper analyses the implications of cost-push shocks for the optimal choice of monetary policy target in an two-country sticky-price model. In addition to cost-push shocks, each country is subject to labour-supply and money-demand shocks. It is shown that the fully optimal coordinated policy...

We define and study transparency, credibility, and reputation in a model where the central bank's characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and are inferred from the policy outcome. A low-credibility bank optimally conducts a more expansionary policy than a high-credibility bank, in...

This paper explicitly models strategic interaction between two independent national fiscal authorities and a single central bank in a simple New Keynesian model of a monetary union. Monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Coordination of fiscal policies...

Economic outcomes in dynamic economies with forward-looking agents depend crucially on whether or not the central bank can precommit, even in the absence of the traditional inflation bias. This paper quantifies the welfare differential between precommitment and discretionary policy in both a...