Vertical integration is often proposed as a way to resolve hold-up problems, ignoring the empirical fact that division managers tend to maximize divisional (not firmwide) profit when investing. This paper develops a model with asymmetric information at the bargaining stage and investment returns...

In this paper I use a principal-agent framework to explore the relation between the hierarchical structure of firms and the accounting information technologies available to them. I allow the principal to choose the number of layers in the firm, the number of agents in each layer, and the...

This paper develops the tests a standard-based control system model which consists of three interrelated controls-participative standard setting, standard-based incentives, and standard tightness-as well as selected antecedents (task variety, task analyzability, information asymmetry) and...

We develop a theory of delegation within organizations where agents are privately informed about whether they should be engaged in exploitation or in exploration activities. Excessive delegation lead agents to inefficiently herd into exploration in an attempt to boost their market value. The...

Vertical integration is often proposed as a way to resolve hold-up problems in connection with specific investments. However, decision-makers are generally compensated based on divisional (not firm-wide) profit. Hence, hold-up problems are bound to resurface in integrated firms. This paper...

We study the determinants of organizational slack in large decentralized firms and focus in particular on how management accounting systems (represented by business unit controllers) affect slack. We rely on an adverse selection model to derive several predictions and to motivate our tests....

This paper intends to contribute to the (bounded rationality) foundations of trust, showing how the concept of trust is related to the basic hypothesis on the behavior of the two people involved. First, I briefly review some definitions of trust found in the literature, and attempt to establish...

A perplexing yet persistent empirical finding is that individuals assess probabilities in words and in numbers nearly equivalently, and theorists have called for future research to search for factors that cause differences. This study uses an accounting context in which individuals are commonly...

This study investigates determinants of budgetary slack using the framework of agency theory and the methods of experimental economics. A computerized, five-period experiment is designed to test the robustness of prior experimental results documenting budgeting behavior inconsistent with...

This study reports the results of three experiments that examine how preferences for wealth and honesty affect managerial reporting. We find that subjects often sacrifice wealth to make honest or partially honest reports, and they generally do not lie more as the payoff to lying increases. We...