This study experimentally evaluates the performance of partial equilibrium mechanisms when different sectors run their mechanisms separately, despite the existence of complementarity between them.In our simple laboratory experiment setting that includes two sectors, each sector runs the...

This study experimentally evaluates the performance of partial equilibrium mechanisms when different sectors run their mechanisms separately, despite the existence of complementarity between them. In our simple laboratory experiment setting that includes two sectors, each sector runs the...

Choice behavior is rational if it is based on the maximization of some context-independent preference relation. This study re-examines the questions of implementation theory in a setting where players’ choice behavior need not be rational and coalition formation must be taken into account. Our...

Consider a society with a finite number of sectors (social issues or commodities). In a partial equilibrium (PE) mechanism a sector authority (SA) aims to elicit agents' preference rankings for outcomes at hand, presuming separability of preferences, while such presumption is false in general...

We study a dynamic public capital accumulation model with infinitely-lived agents who follow the standard discounted utility model in their roles as consumers and voters. Saving policies are determined sequentially, period-by-period, by majority voting. When there is discounting heterogeneity,...