We analyze the problem of coordinating upon asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric game, such as the battle-of-the-sexes. In repeated interaction, asymmetric coordination is possible possible via symmetric repeated game strategies. This requires that players randomize initially and adopt a...

064Taylor's model of staggered contracts is an influential explanation for nominal inertia and the persistent real effects of nominal shocks. However, in standard imperfect competition models, if agents are allowed to choose the timing of pricing decisions, they will typically choose to...

1This paper incorporates earlier work by Bhaskar [4] and unpublished notes by van Damme. We are grateful to Tilman Börgers, Dilip Mookherjee, Debraj Ray, an anonymous referee, an associate editor, and numerous seminar audiences for useful comments. The first author thanks the CentER for...

Although a mixed strategy can never be evolutionarily stable in a truly asymmetric contest, examples show that mixed strategies can satisfy the weaker criterion on neutral stability. This paper shows that such examples are rare, and, generically, a mixed strategy is unstable. We apply the result...

Parsons and Goldin (in Econ Inq 637–659, 1989) use the US Commissioner of Labor Survey of (1890) to argue that many American parents sacrificed the future earnings of their children by sending them to work rather than to school. We analyze the same data and argue that parental choices were...