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Partial privatization and yardstick competition

Bhaskar, V.; Gupta, Bishnupriya; Khan, Mushtaq - In: The economics of transition 14 (2006) 3, pp. 459-478

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007267712

"Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor Markets"

Bhaskar, V.; Manning, Alan; To, Ted - In: The journal of economic perspectives : EP ; a journal … 16 (2002) 2, pp. 155-174

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007037904

Beauty and the Sources of Discrimination

Belot, Michèle.; Bhaskar, V.; Ven, Jeroen van de. - In: Journal of human resources : JHR 47 (2012) 3, pp. 851-873

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009987193

Can Observers Predict Trustworthiness?

Belot, Michèle; Bhaskar, V.; van de Ven, Jeroen - In: The review of economics and statistics 94 (2012) 1, pp. 246-260

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009826314

Parental altruism and child labor : examining the historical evidence from the United States

Bhaskar, V.; Gupta, Bishnupriya - In: Cliometrica : journal of historical economics and … 6 (2012) 3, pp. 249-266

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010029813

Purification in the infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma

Bhaskar, V.; Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Review of economic dynamics 11 (2008) 3, pp. 515-529

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008851928

Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation

Bhaskar, V. - In: Journal of economic theory 82 (1998) 1, pp. 110-131

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007693077

Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems

Bhaskar, V. - In: The review of economic studies 65 (1998) 222, pp. 135-150

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007696863

Promises and cooperation: Evidence from a TV game show

Belot, Michèle; Bhaskar, V.; van de Ven, Jeroen - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 73 (2010) 3, pp. 396-406

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008387220

A Foundation for Markoiv Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

Bhaskar, V.; Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 2009

We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204654