We provide a methodology to simulate the coordinated effects of a proposed merger using data commonly available to antitrust authorities. The model follows the price leadership structure in Miller, Sheu, and Weinberg (2021) in an environment with logit or nested logit demand. The model...

We analyze the accuracy of first order approximation, a method developed theoretically in Jaffe and Weyl (2012) for predicting the price effects of mergers, and provide an empirical application. Approximation is an alternative to the model-based simulations commonly employed in industrial...

We demonstrate that cost pass-through can be used to inform demand calibration, potentially eliminating the need for data on margins, diversion, or both. We derive the relationship between cost pass-through and consumer demand using a general oligopoly model of Nash-Bertrand competition and...

We study an infinitely-repeated game of oligopolistic price leadership in which one firm, the leader, proposes a supermarkup over Bertrand prices to a coalition of rivals. We estimate the model with aggregate scanner data on the beer industry and find the supermarkup accounts for 6% of price....

We analyze mergers and entry in a differentiated products oligopoly model of price competition. Any merger that does not yield efficiencies is unprofitable if it induces entry sufficient to preserve pre-merger consumer surplus. Thus, mergers occur in equilibrium only if barriers limit entry....

We use Monte Carlo experiments to evaluate whether "upward pricing pressure" (UPP) accurately predicts the price effects of mergers, motivated by the observation that UPP is a restricted form of the first order approximation derived in Jaffe and Weyl (2013). Results indicate that UPP is quite...

We examine local market concentration and markups in the United States cement industry over 1974-2016. We estimate a model in which buyers use a second-score auction to procure cement from spatially differentiated plants. The model matches aggregated outcomes in the data, and the implied...