We analyze how consumer myopia influences investment incentives into a technology that enables firms to track consumers' purchases and make targeted offers based on their preferences. In a two-period Hotelling setup firms may invest in customer-tracking technology. If a firm acquires the...

In this note we analyze the sustainability of collusion in a game of repeated interaction where firms can price discriminate among consumers based on two types of customer data. This work is related to Liu and Serfes (2007) and Sapi and Suleymanova (2013). Following Sapi and Suleymanova we...

Personalized pricing has become a reality through digitization. We examine firms' incentives to adopt one of the three pricing schemes: uniform, personalized, or group pricing in a Hotelling duopoly model. There are two types of consumer groups that are heterogeneous in their mismatch costs. We...

We consider product markets in which consumers are interested only in a specific product category and initially do not know which product category matches their tastes. Using sophisticated tracking technologies, an intermediary can make inferences about a consumer's preferred product category...

This study explores the welfare impact of personalized pricing for consumers in a duopolistic two-sided market, with consumers single-homing and developers affiliating with a platform according to their outside option. Personalized pricing, which is private in nature, cannot influence...

This paper provides useful implications for managers and marketing practitioners using data on consumers' purchase history for price discrimination purposes. It is also useful for competition policy agencies and consumer advocates. It highlights that the shape of preferences plays an important...

We study a model of behavior-based price discrimination where firms can agree to share customer information that can be used for personalized pricing. We show that firms are better off sharing customer information as it softens up-front competition when they gather information, consumers are...

This paper analyzes a market in which two horizontally differentiated firms compete by setting menus of two-part tariffs, and in which some consumers are not informed about the linear per-unit price component. We consider two regulatory interventions that limit firms’ ability to price...

We discuss the effect of personalized pricing on profits and welfare in a Hotelling model in which consumers can simultaneously purchase from both firms. As the additional gain from the second purchase increases, personalized pricing is more likely to harm (resp., benefit) consumers (resp.,...

This note compares monopoly equilibrium outcomes with those of duopoly when firms price their products with two-part tariffs. Although a monopolistic firm never charges a lower marginal price than imperfectly competitive firms, it sets a lower entry fee under certain market conditions. In turn,...