We formalize an econometric model for two-sided matching mechanisms in a school choice context, where exogenous … variation is generated by using lotteries as a tie-breaking mechanism. Our model accommodates a wide range of matching …

research designs and the fundamental role of theory in drawing causal inferences from empirical evidence …

Vulnerability to manipulation is a threat to successful matching market design. However, some manipulation is often …

We study a large market model of dynamic matching with no monetary transfers and a continuum of agents. Time is …

-sided matching markets, such as school choice, labour markets and kidney exchange, relies on both theory as well as on empirical …The Nobel prize in economics in 2012 was awarded to Lloyd S. Shapley and Alvin E. Roth for “the theory of stable … foundations of the theory of stable allocations (in particular the celebrated deferred-acceptance algorithm) as well as the …

We introduce a simple model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically …, and the composition of the trade network depends endogenously on the matching algorithm. Varying the timing properties of … matching algorithms can substantially affect their performance, and this depends crucially on the information structure. More …

We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of matching in trading networks …

The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise … matching process. Under this assumption, a centralized matching market can often outperform a decentralized one. Using a quasi …