Similar Search Results

Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Receivers

Wang, Yun - 2015

This paper investigates the role of persuasion mechanisms in collective decision-making. A biased sender adopts a Bayesian persuasion mechanism to provide a committee of uninformed receivers with signals about the unknown state of the world. We compare public persuasion with private persuasion....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013020009

Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Receivers

Wang, Yun - 2015

This paper investigates the role of persuasion mechanisms in collective decision-making. A persuasion mechanism consists of a family of conditional distributions over the underlying state space and the generated noisy signals. A biased, perfectly informed sender adopts a persuasion mechanism to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013020031

Cheap Talk with Transparent Motives

Lipnowski, Elliot - 2020

examine the sender's benefits from communication, assess the value of commitment, and explicitly solve for sender …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854470

Bayesian Persuasion with Costly Information Acquisition

Matysková, Ludmila - 2018

A sender who chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver can often influence the receiver's subsequent actions. Is persuasion more difficult when the receiver has her own sources of information? Does the receiver benefit from having additional information sources? We consider a Bayesian persuasion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012921920

Effective Persuasion

Chen, Ying; Olszewski, Wojciech - 2011

Do elementary statistics or equilibrium theory deliver any rules of thumb regarding how we should argue in debates? We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043082

When Does Coordination Require Centralization

Alonso, Ricardo; Dessein, Wouter; Matouschek, Niko - 2006

for coordination improves horizontal communication but worsens vertical communication. As a result, no matter how …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014056693

How to talk to multiple audiences

Goltsman, Maria (contributor); Pavlov, Gregory (contributor) - 2008

We analyze the performance of various communication protocols in a generalization of the Crawford-Sobel (1982) model of … possible that informative communication with one or both receivers is impossible in private, but possible in public. When the … by public communication with the flexibility provided by private communication and transmit more information to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003772300

Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection

Ederer, Florian; Min, Weicheng - 2021

We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Receiver can detect lies with positive probability. We show that the Sender lies more when the lie detection probability increases. As long as the lie detection probability is sufficiently small the Sender's and the Receiver's equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013238760

Voluntary bankruptcy as preemptive persuasion

Dinev, Nikolay - 2017

This paper examines the phenomenon of management-initiated, court-supervised reorganization of companies in U.S. bankruptcy court. The proposed in-court persuasion mechanism reconciles excessive reorganizations of non-viable companies (and subsequent repeat failures) with management-initiated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011779720

Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection

Ederer, Florian; Min, Weicheng - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022

How does lie detection constrain the potential for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Receiver can detect lies with positive probability. We show that the Sender lies more when the lie detection probability increases. As...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013210093