Transparency of quality in the healthcare sector primarily aims to facilitate patients' care decisions, however, it also provides useful information to competing healthcare providers. We study how competitors respond to increased transparency about rivals' quality by exploiting a regulatory...

In this paper, we study how rational agents infer the quality of a good (a product or a service) by observing the queue that is formed by other rational agents to obtain the good. Agents also observe privately the realization of a signal that is imperfectly correlated with the true quality of...

An agent samples projects over time, observing quality for each, while aprincipal can select at most one. The principal values quality, whereas the agent onlywants a project chosen. Transfers are unavailable. We determine the optimal mechanismwhen the principal can verify quality by paying a...

Asymmetric information can distort market outcomes. I study how the online disclosure of information affects consumers' behavior and firms' incentives to upgrade product quality in markets where information is traditionally limited. I first build a model of consumer search with firms' endogenous...

I model a firm that invests in both the quality of its product and in providing information to the market. Consumers learn about the quality through both news the firm cannot influence and promotion it controls. This ability to promote creates and enhances incentives for investment. Promotion...

High-powered reimbursement systems such as capped budgets or prospective payment systems offer powerful incentives to hospitals to reduce their expenses, particularly in high cost areas such as operating rooms (ORs). Specialization is one prominent response strategy to such pressures. This study...