Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic misrepresentation: reporting a truncation of one's true...

We present results from experiments containing incentivized school-choice scenarios. In these scenarios, we vary whether schools’ assessments of students are based on a common priority (inducing correlation in admissions decisions) or are based on independent assessments (eliminating...

A collaboration of medical professionals with economists and computer scientists involved in ?market design? had led to the redesign of the clearinghouse assigning medical students to internships in Israel. The new mechanism presents significant efficiency gains relative to the previous one, and...

In variants of the Electronic Mail Game (Rubinstein, 1989) where two or more players communicate via multiple channels, the multiple channels can facilitate collective action via redundancy, the sending of the same message along multiple paths or else repeatedly along the same path (Chwe, 1995...

Although no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants (Roth, 1982), recent studies have presented conditions under which truthful reporting by all agents is close to optimal (Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005, Kojima and Pathak, 2009 and Lee,...