-liability (JL) to individual liabil- ity (IL) lending models. This article tests a theory explaining this shift, focusing on … borrowers matching into groups exposed to similar economic shocks under JL, diminishing its effectiveness. I reconcile …

We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker-firm matching under continuously transferable utility …

Vulnerability to manipulation is a threat to successful matching market design. However, some manipulation is often …

We study a one-to-one two-sided matching market in which each man has a common value for all women and a private value … which a woman proposes to a random man in each step. We prove that envy in a matching market is bounded by envy in this … of the square root of the number of men in each type. Therefore, in large matching markets, envy becomes zero; on top of …

The size of a matching is defined as the expected number of agents who are matched to some objects. It is an important …. This paper studies the matching size achieved by strategy-proof mechanisms in a general model of matching with constraints … of classical mechanisms may generate an arbitrarily small matching when we have such generalized constraints. Assuming a …