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A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design
Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - 2021
We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220157
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Competing with Asking Prices
Lester, Benjamin - 2013
In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller is willing to take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087203
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Competing with Asking Prices
Lester, Benjamin - 2013
In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller is willing to take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087422
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A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - 2021
We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584083
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Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms
Akbarpour, Mohammad - 2020
negative externalities” and guarantees a fraction β in the worst case, then that guarantee persists when investment is possible …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012840745
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In Search of Advice for Participants in Constrained School Choice
Decerf, Benoit; Van der Linden, Martin - 2018
School choice mechanisms are typically constrained, with students allowed to report preferences on a limited number of schools only Under constraints, the deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) is manipulable and it is unclear how students should play in DA. In order to provide advice to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014117156
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Transparent matching mechanisms
Möller, Markus - 2024
I study a central authority's ability to commit to a publicly announced mechanism in a one-to-one agent-object matching model. The authority announces a strategy-proof mechanism and then privately selects a mechanism to initiate a matching. An agent's observation in form of the final matching...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014533360
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Stability in Sequential Matching with Incomplete Information
Shi, Fanqi - 2021
matching in the first period. Investment increases each agent's matching surplus in the second period, by a magnitude of the … worker's investment ability in the match pair. Assuming each worker's investment ability is her private information that … delay coincides on the same side of the market, efficient investment occurs in any sequentially stable outcome. When every …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013245004
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Stability with One-Sided Incomplete Information
Bikhchandani, Sushil - 2017
Two notions of stability, ex ante stability and Bayesian stability, are investigated in a matching model with non-transferrable utility, interdependent preferences, and one-sided incomplete information. Ex ante stable matching-outcomes are unblocked for every belief on the blocking partner's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012965814
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Finding a Stable Matching under Type-specific Minimum Quotas
Tomoeda, Kentaro - 2019
In matching problems with minimum and maximum type-specific quotas, there may not exist a stable (i.e., fair and non-wasteful) assignment (Ehlers et al., 2014). This paper investigates the structure of schools' priority rankings which guarantees stability. First, we show that there always exists...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012865972