Scholars in economics and political science argue that one major function of government is to overcome coordination failure in economic development, especially during times of rapid environmental changes. But, how and through what means does the state coordinate firms to follow the changing...

Why do politicians who have short tenure expectations have incentives to invest in long-term infrastructure projects? This mismatch between politicians' short tenures and the long-term needed for infrastructure projects to come to fruition is generally expected to result in under-investment in...

Recent research shows that political centralization can reduce elite capture and improve governance outcomes. Despite these benefits, we demonstrate that there is a limit for an independent-minded, centralized bureaucracy to eliminate the influence of private and local interests. We study a...

How does political patronage influence investment in critical infrastructure and economic growth in the long term? With a difference-in-differences design applied to the setting of China, I show that cities whose leaders established patron-client connections with their provincial superiors...

Governmental fiscal transfers can be important tools for redistributing resources and enhancing public services in areas with limited local resources. Meanwhile, politicians can use fiscal transfers to build patronage networks, weaken opposition candidates, or engage in rent-seeking. An...

We study sourcing in a supply chain with three levels: a manufacturer, Tier 1 suppliers, and Tier 2 suppliers prone to disruption from, e.g., natural disasters like earthquakes or floods. The manufacturer may not directly dictate which Tier 2 suppliers are used, but may influence the sourcing...