The insightful contributions shed new light on insufficiently examined issues and highlight connections that cut across the many different domains in which such regulations operate. Building upon the framework presented by David Post – one of the first and most prominent scholars of cyber...

Contemporary intellectual property theory concentrates on the cumulative and incremental nature of innovation and creation. A prevalent image depicts authors and inventors as "standing on the shoulders of giants". This Article focuses on a different type of innovation that has been largely...

This Chapter challenges the prevailing view pertaining to the connection between broad copyright protection and lack of cultural diversity. Prominent scholarship in the field of copyright links the lack of diversity in cultural consumption to the broad copyright protection afforded to cultural...

We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We show that under weak risk aversion: 1) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. 2) Buyers with low...

In this study we demonstrate how a reference price may affect the degree of price rigidity|flexibility. For this, we construct a model of reference-price formation, which we use to analyze the effect of asymmetric reference price (cut 'effects') on the profitability of price promotions. We...

We study second price auctions with weakly asymmetric interdependent values where bidders' signals for the value are independently and identically distributed. We also prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among all standard auctions with weakly asymmetric interdependent values.

We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We show that under weak risk aversion: 1) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. 2) Buyers with low...

We study private-value auctions with a large number of bidders. We calculate approximations of the equilibrium bids and the seller's revenue in first-price auctions regardless of whether the bidders are symmetric or asymmetric, or risk-neutral or risk-averse. Furthermore, we show that...