The concept of 'the core' originates in cooperative game theory and its introduction to economics in the 1960s as a … questions in economics. Discovery of the core was met with enthusiasm among the community of economic theorists at the time …. However, use of the core eventually waned and the concept faded into the backdrop of economic theory. This paper makes use of …

In auctions with externalities, it is well-known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of … the sense that the seller and the bidders experience justified envy. We show that the core is nonempty if bidders cannot …

A longstanding criticism of the core is that it is too sensitive to small changes in player numbers, as in a well known … and decreasing over time even with institutions that facilitate collusion and, consistent with core theory, a …

direct assumption that preferences have maximal elements on a fixed agenda. We show that the core of a simple game is … number of the game. The same is true if we replace the core by the core without majority dissatisfaction, obtained by … deleting from the agenda all the alternatives that are non-maximal for all players in a winning coalition. Unlike the core, the …

strictly positive, then the inner core is nonempty. The condition on normal vectors is satisfied if the set of payoff vectors … on the nonemptiness of the inner core …

a contractual approach and based on the notion of fuzzy contractual allocation, see Marakulin (2011, 2013). Core … core converts into a classical one when the market turns complete. Under perfect competition conditions, core allocations … are GEI-equilibria. These properties prove the validity of the suggested core …

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or …

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or …

bilateral consistency à la Hart and Mas-Colell. We prove that the egalitarian solution is the unique core selection that … satisfies AM and bounded richness, requiring that the poorest players cannot be made richer within the core. Replacing “poorest …