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Benoit, Sylvain; Riabi, Maroua - 2021

We propose a model with incomplete information where a distressed bank asks its creditor, a healthy bank, to reduce its debt. Given the information disclosed by the regulator about the asset quality of the distressed bank and its possible bailout by the government, the healthy bank can accept or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013248510

Communication and hidden action : a credit market experiment

Brown, Martin; Schmitz, Jan; Zehnder, Christian - 2023

We study the impact of pre-contractual communication on market outcomes when economic relationships are subject to … (first movers) prior to entering the credit relationship. Communication reduces moral hazard (strategic default) and … weaker impact of communication. Borrowers are more likely to renege on repayment promises when they can hide opportunistic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014301388

Constrained Persuasion with private information

Kosenko, Andrew - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 23 (2023) 1, pp. 345-370

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013555588

Strategic communication : an experimental investigation

Eckartz, Katharina; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - 2014

other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs … communication is less biased. In all treatments, however, the messages are more precise than theoretically predicted. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085

Asymmetric and endogenous communication in competition between groups

Cason, Timothy N.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010528943

Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk

Ivanov, Maxim - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 15 (2015) 2, pp. 251-275

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011339388

Communication games with optional verification

Schopohl, Simon - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011992676

Communication games with optional verification

Schopohl, Simon - 2016

We consider a Sender-Receiver game in which the Sender can choose between sending a cheap-talk message, which is costless, but also not verified and a costly verified message. While the Sender knows the true state of the world, the Receiver does not have this information, but has to choose an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576182

Strategic reasoning in persuasion games : an experiment

Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard - 2018

We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811807

Can communication mitigate strategic delays in investment timing?

Mermer, Ayse; Onderstal, Sander; Sonnemans, Joep - 2023

how communication mitigates this free-riding problem in an investment-timing game. In our baseline investment-timing game …. If more investors invest at the same time, they share the costs. In the communication treatment, subjects can freely … communicate before choosing the investment time. We find that in groups of two players, communication increases cooperation and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014299600